Considerable controversy exists regarding the usefulness of municipal accounting information. Efforts to modify the present reporting framework for municipalities are predicated upon assertions that the information is not timely, reliable, and/or otherwise useful. In this study, we examined the association between municipal bond rating changes and accounting information to assess (1) whether municipal accounting measures available prior to a bond rating change are useful for predicting the change, and (2) whether municipal accounting measures available subsequent to the rating change reflect the economic conditions which induced the change in ratings. Results are eunbiguous for objective (1) but supportive of objective (2).
models. Thus, this research does not establish the usefulness of the models for ex ante predictions, but provides evidence concerning whether accounting numbers could be potentially useful for such predictions.
' No association would be consistent with the agencies using information other than accounting disclosures in setting ratings. If it is ultimately found that market yields are correlated with accounting disclosures, then this would imply that accounting disclosures are considered in the rating process or that they reflect the same underlying economic changes captured by the ratings.
default risk from quality ratings assigned to securities by an investment advisory agency, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's. These agencies evaluate and grade the quality of a bond in relative terms according to the probability of default. Empirical research on corporate bond quality supports the notion that agency ratings do discriminate among bonds as to the likelihood of default (e.g., see Hickman [1958] ). In contrast, empirical research on municipal bond quality found that municipal bond ratings prior to the 1940s were poor indicators of the probability of default, and that since then, too few municipal bonds have defaulted to establish the ability of ratings to signal default (Hempel [1971] ). Nevertheless, ratings are still relied upon to rank municipalities in terms of default probabilities.
Differences between risk-free and municipal yields may also reflect differences in mJirketability, that is, the ability of a holder to convert a security into cash. In general, the lower the marketability, the greater the yield necessary to attract investors, ceteris paribus. While Hastie [1972] and Shannon [1974] both find strong support for a marketability effect in municipal bond yields. Shannon's evidence indicates that Moody's bond ratings capture marketability risk in addition to default risk. Thus, bond ratings may be an effective surrogate for this element as well.
The term structure of municipal bond yields describes differences in yields associated with differences in maturity dates, all other factors constant. Dougall and Gaumnitz [1980, p. 168] find that municipal yields reflect a much greater term structure effect than do yields on Treasury obligations. However, the term structure on municipal bond yields appears to be preserved within bond rating classes (e.g., see Robinson [1960, p. 186] ). Therefore, bond ratings can also be used to obtain information about default and marketability risk for securities of similar term structures (or when this factor is controlled).
The relationship between municipal bond rating changes and bond yields was recently investigated by Ingram, Brooks, and Copeland [1982] . A sample of noncallable, general obligation bonds was selected for which yield data were available from the Blue List,^ The sample represented 20 down-rated, 13 up-rated, and 94 unchanged municipalities. Using a matched pairs design to control for systematic risk, they examined the monthly holding-period retums during the eight months prior to the rating changes and the eight months subsequent to this date. The results are illustrated in figure 1. The impact of a changed rating clearly occurs during the month of the change. Prior to < = 0, the cumulative differential holding-period return wanders about the zero level with no obvious directional differences for the uprated and downrated groups. For f = 0 ' The Blue List Indicates offering yields which can be expected to be higher than trading yields. However, this bias is expected to be systematic across securities and should not affect comparisons of holding period retums. and thereafter, the magnitude and direction of change is pronounced and persistent. The mean return differentials are significant at a = .05 only in month 0. This evidence suggests that bond rating changes are important information to creditors, and that altemative sources of information (such as accounting variables) about risk changes are not being impounded by the market prior to the approximate date of the rating change."*
Research Design
The present study differs from previous studies of municipal bond ratings (e.g., Hempel [1967] , Morton [1976] , Michel [1977] , and Carleton and Lemer [1969] ) in purpose and design. Our study is concerned with an examination of the timeliness and reliability of accounting numbers for predicting changes in bond ratings, wherejis previous studies attempted to develop optimal prediction models.
Two multiple discriminant models were constructed, one to test whether municipal accounting measures available prior to a rating chfinge * In contrast to these findings, empirical research conceming corporate bond ratings questions the integrity of bond ratings as measures of credit quality. Reilly and Joehnk [1976] , for example, identified a weak relationship between the systematic risk of corporate bonds and bond ratings. Pinches and Singleton [1978] and Weinstein [1977] both present evidence that changes in corporate bond ratings lag by several months market changes. However, given the relatively few sources of public information on municipal entities that issue bonds and the potentially high cost of gathering and evaluating such information, bond rating changes might contain, a priori, more information content for municipal investors than for corporate investors.
can be used to predict the change, and the other to test whether municipal accounting measures available subsequent to a rating change refiect the economic conditions which initiated the rating change.
SAMPLE AND DATA
The municipalities and variables used in this study were selected from a computer file developed by us from Bureau of the Census data. The file consists of financial data of the type collected by municipal accounting systems for approximately 1,400 U.S. cities with populations in excess of 10,000. The financial information is collected by the Bureau of the Census and is published annually in summary form in City Government Finances.
From this file, 112 cities were identified which had general obligation bond rating changes (Moody's ratings were used) during fiscal 1976. An additional 56 cities which did not have bond rating changes during the test period, 1975-77, were selected at random from the remaining cities in the file.^ The sample of 168 cities was grouped into three classes-cities without rating changes (56), cities with downgraded ratings (35), and cities with upgraded ratings (77).
The data collected by municipal accounting systems generally include revenues, expenditures, debts, and long-term investments (bond funds, noninsurance funds, sinking funds, etc.). However, since many of the traditional balance sheet and income statement items which are available for business enterprises are not used in the accounting systems of most municipalities (e.g., inventories, fixed assets, owners' equity income, etc.), various financial ratios which are commonly used in the analysis of business enterprises either cannot be computed or do not reveal the same information for governmental organizations. Instead, most of the data available for municipalities refiects infiows and outfiows of liquid resources.
Revenue, expenditure, debt, and investment data were used to calculate 28 ratios for use in this study (see table 1 ). Financial data were converted into ratios partially to control for differences in city size. These 28 accounting ratios represent four economic dimensions of a municipality which may have some bearing on the assessment of default and marketability risks: (1) the relative magnitude of debt requirements-ratios 1-6; Fifty-six was selected because it was the mean of the up-and downrated samples. A much larger sample of unchanged municipalities could have been selected. However, the Lachenbruch method used in this study requires approximately equal group sizes. Also, large differences in group sizes have a potentially detrimental effect on classification results. When one group is substantially larger than the others, the model may be weighted in favor of the large group, producing good classification results for this group at the expense of the other groups (see Cooley and Lohnes [1971] ). This problem was identified in preliminary analyses of our data. Modifications of the discriminant models permit alteration of the weights applied to each group partially to control for this problem (see Eisenbeis and Avery [1972] ). Otherwise, the results of this study might be substantially different if groups sizes were proportional to population sizes. A test of the potential effect of group sizes is described below (see n. 8). (2) the relative magnitude of debt service requirements-ratios 7-9; (3) the relative magnitude of other municipal service requirements-ratios 10-18; and (4) the relative adequacy of revenues-ratios 19-28. Together the four classes of ratios provide comprehensive proxies for default risk and marketability. Their definitions are self-explanatory.
A number of our ratios are similar to those specified in the municipal financifd stress literature as being indicative of liquidity or solvency problems (see Clark et al. [1976] ). Similar ratios have been specified as being useful in evaluating credit standing by municipal bond rating agencies (see Sherwood [1976] ), and several have also been employed in bond rating prediction studies (see Michel [1977] ). Each of the 28 financial ratios was calculated for each of the 168 cities for the years 1975-77. Ratios for each year were examined for interperiod consistency, and outliers in highly skewed distributions were individually examined to verify the accuracy of the underlying financial data.D
ISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
The original specification for the discriminant models used in this research took the foUowing form:
where Group = 1, 2, 3 (for the three rating changes classes, uprated, unchanged, downrated), R = accounting ratio (1 through 28), and t indicates the time period of the ratio measurement (predate or postdate of the rating event). The hypothesis tested, in null form, was: accounting ratios are not useful in classifying group membership (beyond chance alone).
The two discriminant analyses used ratios from two different time periods (relative to the date of the rating change). The first used accounting ratios for fiscal years ending prior to the dates of the rating changes, that is, ratios for fiscal 1975 or 1976 with rating changes occurring within 12 months subsequent to the respective fiscal year-end. The second analysis used data for fiscal years ending in 1976 and 1977 or after the dates of the rating change.
Because of the relatively small sample size in the downrated group, the Lachenbruch (Jackknife) classification procedure was used to determine the classificatory accuracy of the discriminant models. This procedure, as well as the other discriminant procedures used in this study, is considered relatively unbiased and efficient (see Eisenbeis [1977] ).
Results
Equality of covariance matrices for all discriminant models was rejected so quadratic functions were employed. Eight accounting variables appear in the prior-year model and seven in the subsequent-year model. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the nine accounting ratios used * The extreme values for nine ratios, representing 3 percent of each distribution, were replaced by substitute values equal to the 97th centile. The resulting means better reflect the central tendency for highly skewed distributions, and the variances are also reduced. (Our transformed means can be likened to Winsorized means: see Bhattacharyya and Johnson [1977] .) Ratios 3 and 20 were thus transformed, and they are elemente of our final discriminant models. In addition, ratios 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16 , and 18 were also transformed. either in each model or both. The first two columns of table 3 identify the ratios by number and name as per table 1. The ratios are listed in order of the percentage of total discriminating power attributable to each, shown in the third and fourth columns. The remaining columns provide a time-series profile of the means and standard deviations of the ratios for the years, four years prior to the rating changes through the yeiir after the changes.
The means of ratios 20, 27, 21, and 4 from the prior-year model reflect a monotonic relationship across groups with uprated municipalities at the other. The first three of these four ratios provide information on the relative adequacy of revenue, while ratio 4 is a measure of the relative magnitude of debt.
The means of the other four ratios do not exhibit a monotonic relationship that parallels the rating change spectrum. These ratios help distinguish (in a multivariate sense) between only two of the three rating groups, as can be seen by the large size of the difference between group means. Ratio 3 (short-term debt), 23 (property tax), and 13 (vital expenditures) differentiate the downrated group from the other groups. Combined, ratios 3 and 23 account for 45.5 percent of the total discriminatory power of the eight ratios. The test of equality of group means for the prior-year model produced an F-value of 6.95 (significant at the .0001 level), indicating that the independent variables are significantly different across groups.
The first five ratios in the subsequent-year model are the same as those in the prior-year model and collectively account for 87 percent and 84 percent, respectively, of the total discriminating power of the two models. The subsequent-year discriminant function contains one ratio (19) fi-om the "revenue adequacy" class which replaces two others (27, 21) in the prior-year model. The last variable in both discriminant functions is identical. Thus, the two discriminant functions have very similar structures. The means of ratios 20 and 19 refiect a monotonic relationship across rating groups in the subsequent-year model, while the means for ratios 3, 23, and 13 exhibit a pattem similar to that for the prior-year model. Although the three means for ratio 3 also refiect a monotonic relationship across rating groups in the subsequent-year model, the major difference is still found between the unchanged and downrated groups. The mean of ratio 4 for the downrated group still exhibits an extreme value, but now it is the largest rather than the smallest value. The Fvalue of 7.63 for testing equality of group means is significant at the .0001 level, indicating that the independent variables are significantly different across groups for the subsequent-year model.
The classificatory accuracy of the eight-variable, prior-year model in the initial model formulation stage, as weD as in the Lachenbruch prediction stage, is presented in table 3. In the model formulation stage (panel A), the uprated and downrated groups were accurately classified, but the unchanged group tended to be substantially misclassified as belonging to the uprated class. The sample size differences between these two groups resulted in more misclassification of the unchanged than the uprated group. Overall correct classification was 79 percent, but fell to 55 percent in the Lachenbruch stage (panel B). However, the latter is still significantly better than the results expected due to chance,' and so the null hypothesis is rejected. As in panel A, the best predictive accuracy was achieved for the uprated and downrated groups. The 55-percent predictive accuracy achieved in this test is comparable to results found in studies of predictive accuracy of corporate rating changes, giving due recognition to differences in sample sizes, group structure, etc. (e.g., see Altman and Katz [1976] and Soldofsky, Bhandari, and Boe [1980] ).
The classificatory accuracy of the seven-variable, subsequent-year model in the initial model formulation stage, as well as in the Lachenbruch "parameter stability determination" stage, is presented in table 4. The multiple discriminant function correctly classified 83 percent of the 168 rating changes in the model building stage (panel A), with the accuracy of the downrated and uprated groups exceeding that of the unchanged group. However, substantially fewer unchanged municipalities ' The proportional chance criterion is appropriate for establishing the number of correct classifications expected by chance when the focus is on the percentage correctly classified over all groups simultaneously. Under this criterion, the expected probability of correct classifications over all groups is equal to (pi)^ + (pi)* • • • + (p»)^ where pi equals the prior probability in the (experimental) population of an observation belonging to the first group. Pi is the prior probability of an observation belonging to the second group, etc. For our sample of 168 cities, the percentage correct classification expected due to chance equals 36 percent, which is significantly different at the .05 level than the 55-percent correct classification achieved by the discriminant model. See Pinches [1978, p. 33 ] for a discussion of the proportional chance criterion. were misclassified. This difference appears to be a primary explanation for the improved discriminant ability of the subsequent-year model.*
The overall classificatory accuracy fell to 69.6 percent in the Lachenbruch stage, indicating that the model parameters are sensitive to the sample. Classificatory accuracy substantially improved for the uprated and unchanged groups, and marginally declined for the downrated group, compared to results disclosed in table 3. An overall rate of 69.6 percent accuracy is significantly better (at the .05 level) than results expected by chance, so the null hypothesis is again rejected.
Discussion
Most of the ratio means shown in table 3 follow an intuitive pattem across groups. Reliance on short-term debt (ratio 3) is considerably higher for the downrated group for all five years shown. This may be an indication of the inadequacy of current revenues to provide for coverage of service and debt requirements. Reliance on property tax (ratio 23) demonstrates a similar pattern to the short-term debt ratio. Property taxes provide a much higher percentage of total revenues for the downrated group than for the other groups. The effect of the increase in reliance on property taxes also is observed in the revenue diversification ratio (ratio 21). Another indication of the change in risk can be observed from the self-reliance ratio (ratio 22). In the years immediately before *The subsequent-year model was also examined using group sizes that were more proportional to the population. Six hundred and forty municipalities were identified that did not have rating changes during the test period. These municipalities constituted the unchanged groups. The classification results differed from those in table 5 in that a higher percentage of the unchanged group was correctly classified (86.4) while smaller percentages of the uprated (78.6) and the downrated (84.3) groups were correctly classified. and after the rating changes, the ratio increases for the uprated and unchanged groups and decreases for the downrated group. The current surplus ratio (ratio 27) confirms the financial difficulty experienced by the downrated group.
The two other revenue-related ratios, per capita revenue (ratio 20) and direct revenue (ratio 19), demonstrate pattems across rating groups that appear to be anomalous. This relationship is contrary to our (univariate) expectation about the adequacy of available revenues but may be explained in a multivariate sense. The current surplus ratio indicates a problem in the revenue-expenditure balance for the downrated group. The per capita and direct revenues reflect the larger per capita budgets of the downrated group that place more burden on the municipalities' taxpayers, thus necessitating higher tax rates (ratio 23) and outside funding demands (ratio 22). Accordingly, the per capita and direct revenue ratios appear to measure the level of burden placed on a municipality's financial base rather than the adequacy of revenues.
The remaining ratios in table 3, vital expenditure weight (ratio 13) and matching source and use of funds (ratio 4), related to municipal expenditures. The vital expenditure ratio is consistently larger for the downrated group, indicating that a greater percentage of total expenditures are used to cover vital services. Thus, less is available for discretionary services and debt payments.
The matching source and use of funds ratio measures the relationship between long-term debt and capital expenditures. The downrated group displays the largest ratio among the rating groups in the year after the rating change but the smallest ratio in the year before. This condition would suggest that the municipalities in the downrated group are consistent in the matching of long-term debt and capital expenditures. In the prior year, capital expenditures are paid out of current funds which may then be replaced by long-term debt in the subsequent year, a debatable management practice.
Since some of the ratio pattems remain relatively stable over the years shown in table 3, we extended the discriminant analysis to the prior years to determine whether the model parameters were stable over this period and whether predictions of the rating changes could be made several years prior to the changes. The parameters for the subsequent-year model were applied to data for each of the prior years, thus treating them as holdout samples. Results are shown in table 5.
Classification results for the year immediately prior to the rating changes are not very different from the Lachenbruch analysis of the prior-year model (e.g., 62 percent, 38 percent, and 60 percent for the uprated, unchanged, and downrated groups, respectively). This is not surprising, given the similarity in the subsequent year and prior-year models. The results do not deteriorate extensively in the two-years-prior analysis (e.g., 60 percent, 34 percent, and 38 percent). The overlap between the unchanged and uprated groups remains high (particularly in the misdassification of the unchanged group). The classification results deteriorate rapidly in the periods three years and four years before the rating changes. The distinction between the uprated and unchanged groups is very unclear, and the distinction between the downrated and unchanged groups is not clear in the four-yearsbefore analysis. These findings indicate that the model parameters do not remain stable over a period of more than a few years and that longterm predictions of bond rating changes are not highly reliable (using the models in this study).
The results of this study provide some support for the contention that municipal accounting numbers are reliable (ex post) measures of quality changes refiected in bond rating changes. In particular, the results of the postchange analysis indicate that a significant correlation exists between the two risk measures. On the other hand, the results provide weak support for the contention that accounting numbers are timely measures of changes in risk (as measured by their ability to predict rating changes). While the classificatory ability of the accounting numbers prior to the rating changes was significantly better than chance, the level of accuracy does not appear to be sufficient to instill faith in their usefulness £is predictors of risk change. This is especially evident in the relatively low classificatory accuracy of the Lachenbruch and holdout analyses."
Asymmetry of misclassification costs becomes important when predicting events as a basis for making investment decisions. Our predictive discriminant model did not consider misclassification costs. The predictive accuracy would have declined had misclassification costs been considered, since most of the misdassifications were in the unchanged group, i.e., traders following the outcome of the model would have incurred transactions costs to acquire bonds that had not changed in rating.
APPENDIX A

Computation of Indexes Source Diversification Index
The index was computed as:
where SDI is the index, r is the amount of revenue received from a specific source, and R is total revenue. The specific sources used in the index included property tax, general sales tax, income tax, outside revenue, and other revenue. The index is constructed so that the more balanced the sources of revenue, the higher the index.
Diversification Trend Index
The index was computed as the percentage change in the SDI.
Service Mix Index
where SMI is the index, e is the amount of expenditure for a specific service, and E is total expenditure. The specific services used in the index included education, health, highways, welfare, sanitation, financial administration, fire, police, and other expenditures. The index is constructed so that the more balanced the service expenditures, the larger the index.
Service Mix Trend Index
The index was computed as the percentage change in the SMI.
